When Hitler was elected to power in 1933, the natural oil resources of the Reich provided less than 10% of Germany's oil requirements at that time. One of the first tasks undertaken by the German Government was to plan for the expansion of the sources of supply. Production of crude oil was increased and the synthetic oil industry was called upon to expand, and support was given for the maximum import of oil from other countries. The expansion of oil production was increases at an amazing rate to the point that by Sept 1939 Germany had increased her crude oil priducition and sunthetic production by almost four times. Germany's refining capacity exceeded 3,000,000 tons a year while seven hydrogenation plants and seven Fisher-Tropsch plants were turning out 120,000 tons of oil from coal a month.

From 1940 until mid 1941 oil was a priority target for Bomber Command. However the RAF was unable to make an impact on the oil production. German's oil production by 1942 was increasing because of German's conquests in the West, South East and East. Because of this the Commanders decided there were more profitable targets that Bomber Command could have an impact. So oil was removed from the top of the priority list until mid 1944.

On 16 Sep 44, the Combined Chiefs of Staff transferred control of the strategic air foces to the Commanding General of the USAAF and to the Chief of the Air Staff(CAS) of the RAF. These new commanders issued a new operations directive on 25 Sep 44 to the strateic air forces with a list of targets in order of priority:

1. Oil targets - 1^st priority
2. Communication targets
3. Tank and Ordnance depots
4. Motor transport plants and depots

The latter 3 were 2^nd priority.

On 25 Mar 44 the CAS ruled that attacks on rail systems would take priority because of the lead up to Overlord. The USAAF still attacked oil targets during this pre-D-Day period. The Intelligence sources were reporting that these attacks were very successful and were having an impact on the German military. The Deputy Supreme Commander during the post-D-Day period, specified that whenever possible oil targets should be attacked. In Sep 44 oil was formally placed as the top priority target. At the beginning of Dec 44 the oil targets consisted of 47 production plants and 45 Petroleum, Oil and Lubrication (POL) depots.

From 1942 onwards, shortages of fuel affected training programmes with the Luftwaffe to an increasing extent until the summer of 1944 when it started to affect operational flying, mainly in the West. Therefore demonstarting that fuel shortages played an pivotal role in the decline of German air power. The second factor impacting German airpower was the bombing and strafing of German airfields.

By April of 1944 productioin of synthetic oil reached levels of 350,000 tons a month.

German Output of Fuels and Lubricants in terms of finished products

(in thousands of tons)

Before the start of the war Germany imported 70% of her oil. By the end of 1940 less than 30% of Germany's oil was imported. From 1941 onward Germany succeeded in obtaining sifnificant quantities of oil from Hungarian and Romanian sources.

By 1942 is was apparent that the production of oil of all kinds was not keeping pace with consumption. Aviation fuel was the biggest problem because consumption always exceeded production.

With Germany's losses in North Africa in 1942 and the defeat in Stalingrad in 1943 made Germany realize it was necessary to build up reserves of fuel to counter any Allied advances and attacks. Stocks of aviation fuel, motor gasoline and diesel oil were increased during 1943. The increase in stocks was created by continued develoopment of crude oil production both within Germany and the territories she controlled, and by more expansion of the synthetic oil industry and by economies in military and civilian consumption. By Sept 1943 for the first time in the war aviation fuel production exceeded consumption. So that when Germany's oil industry was heavily bombed in May 1944, stocks of aviation fuel were higher than ever before. The one critical decision was to reduce Luftwaffe fuel consumption by reducing air training. But at no time before the summer of 1944 did a basic shortage of fuel supplies limit air operations on any front where the Germans wre engaged.

Source: The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945 (The Official Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit